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Although most bank failures and banking problems historically have been attributable to poorly managed
exposures to credit risk, inadequate management of interest rate risk can give rise to the same types of
problems, as illustrated by the U.S. 'savings and loan crisis' of the early 1990s. Interest rate risk is one of the
principal risks inherent in the maturity transformation activity of banks. Excessive or poorly managed exposure
to interest rate risk can menace both the financial balance of specific credit institutions and the overall
stability of the financial system.
The current environment of low interest rates, ongoing developments in regulatory and accounting
standards, and the structural burden of the fixed-rate investment strategy of French banks – and of
continental European banks in general – all combine to make exposure to and management of interest-rate
risk a leading concern of the different actors involved in ensuring financial stability.
In this environment, prudential authorities, along with other authorities responsible for overall financial
stability, need to have accurate indicators of levels and trends in exposure to interest rate risk in the financial
system. However, the diversity of this risk makes it very difficult to select such indicators.
The choice depends heavily on the nature of the interest rate risk – in particular, on the volume of assets and
liabilities containing embedded options –, on the financial structure of the specific institution, and on its
overall strategy. This explains the diversity of practices observed today in the monitoring and management
of interest rate risk. The same factors also make it extremely difficult to establish a harmonised system of
quantitative reporting.
As with other types of risk, the first line of defense against the vulnerabilities associated with interest rate
risk is the soundness and robustness of internal management and control systems. The new capital
framework envisages a tailored supervisory review.82 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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V
ariations in interest rates can have profound
microeconomic and macroeconomic
consequences. Understanding how these
consequences affect financial intermediaries is of
central importance in reaching an overall
assessment of financial stability.
The development of analytic tools and quantitative
standards for measuring and regulating overall risk
exposure, like those that have proved useful in
assessing other types of banking risk, is rendered
extremely difficult, if not impossible, by the close
link between the measure of interest rate risk and
the particular financial characteristics (type of
activity, method of financing) and financial
strategies (hedging of exposures, voluntary
position-taking) of each credit institution. Because
the measurement of interest rate risk depends on
the specific characteristics of each institution, it does
not lend itself to uniform treatment.
Nevertheless, the significance of this risk for
individual credit institutions, and its potential
systemic consequences for the economy as a whole,
calls for bank supervisors, and indeed all authorities
responsible for financial stability, to examine these
questions very closely.
The concern of regulators is heightened by current
developments in the financial environment and by
changes in regulatory and accounting standards
which are likely to increase the sensitivity of certain
institutions to interest rate risk (section 1).
In order to assess the exposure of the French banking
system to interest rate risk, the General Secretariat of
the Banking Commission surveyed seven large banking
groups1 during the second quarter of 2004. In addition
to gathering information on the asset-liability
management (ALM) systems of the institutions
concerned (organisation, risk-measurement systems,
and hedging strategies), the Secretariat administered
stress tests to evaluate the institutions’ ability to
withstand a sudden, large increase in interest rates
– a scenario which cannot be completely ruled out in
light of the current historically low level of interest
rates.
The analysis revealed a high degree of expertise at the
major banking groups, but also a broad diversity in
their practices and strategies. The stress tests indicated
that the French banking system is well able to withstand
a significant increase in interest rates (section 2).
However, with the development of accounting
standards based on market valuation, interest rate risk
is likely to have a greater and more frequent impact
on bank balance sheets and earnings in the future,
making it necessary to strengthen, rationalise, and
harmonise internal control systems for interest rate
risk, particularly in the context of implementation of
Pillar 2 of the new capital framework (section 3).
1| RELEVANCE
OF INTEREST RATE RISK
1|1 A risk inherent in banking activity
The role of credit institutions as financial
intermediaries exposes them to a structural
transformation or interest rate risk, arising from their
use of demand deposits and other forms of short-
term resources to finance assets with long
maturities. There are two explanations for this
situation (reviewed by Maes, 2004).
In the first place, financial intermediaries, as a
natural consequence of their activity, assume
mismatches in maturity2 and/or interest rate
mismatches. This is because non-financial actors are
risk-averse (they are structurally short-term lenders
and long-term borrowers) and because lenders have
relatively little access to information about the credit
quality of borrowers. They therefore transact
through intermediaries – banks – which are better
able to manage problems of imperfect information
about borrowers (Jaffe and Stiglitz, 1990), to make
a choice between different loan demands, and to
ensure that their investments are properly
monitored. Monitoring allows banks to limit the risk
that a borrower will use a loan for purposes other
than those for which the loan was contracted, and
thereby protects the funds of depositors.
1 Basel-II information-gathering missions to BNP-Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel, Caisses d'Épargne, Natexis Banques
Populaires, andCCF.
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3 The interest rate mismatch provides a measure of the sensitivity of the interest margin (the amount of interest paid minus interest received,
resulting from transactions in the banking book) to fluctuations in market interest rates.
4 And in any case differs from that implied by the theory of perfect foresight, which assumes that the return on a long-term risk-free bond is exactly
equal to the combination of the short-term returns of which it is composed.
5 The return which the holder of a long-term security expects to receive, relative to the return on a short-term security. The amount of the risk
premium can vary over time; it is not necessarily either constant, or proportional to the level of interest rates.
In addition, depositors can, in theory, influence the
way in which banks select and manage investment
projects: they have the right to withdraw their funds
at any time (bank run). Thus there is a genuine
economic complementarity between the extension
of credit and the taking of deposits (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983).
In the second place, banks may choose to expose
themselves voluntarily to interest rate mismatches3
– which they may eliminate or reduce through the
use of hedging instruments – either because their
forecast of the evolution of the yield curve differs
from that of the market4, or because they judge the
risk premium5 to be attractive.
1 CBFR Regulation No. 97-02 dated February 21, 1997 .
2 In fact, since market transactions are generally valued at market prices (“marked to market”), interest rate risk, along with other risks, is
immediately reflected in the bank's accounts, and therefore, unlike banking-book transactions, is not subject to special oversight.
Box 1
Sources of interest rate risk
The overall interest rate risk of a financial institution is “the risk of loss to the institution in the event of changes in interest
rates, aggregated across all balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet positions, but excluding any positions subject to market
risk”.1 Interest rate risk is one of the principal risks borne by banks in the normal course of their business.
In practice, institutions distinguish clearly between interest rate risk in the trading book (which generally consists of
transactions valued at market prices)2 and interest rate risk in the banking book – the subject of this article – which is
traditionally managed by the Asset-Liability Management (ALM) function of the bank.
There are three principal sources of interest rate risk in the banking book that necessitate a specific management of this
risk in the ALM framework.
The first source is a mismatch in volume and maturity between fixed-rate assets and fixed-rate liabilities, or between the
dates for re-pricing the interest rates for variable-rate balance-sheet items. For example, a bank that that has financed a
long-term fixed-rate loan (or an excess of fixed-rate assets relative to fixed-rate liabilities at a given maturity) with variable-rate
borrowing is exposed to loss in the event of a sudden increase in interest rates. The longer the maturity of the fixed-rate
assets and the greater the proportion of fixed-rate assets on the institution’s balance sheet, the greater is this risk.
The second source of interest rate risk arises when variable-rate assets and liabilities are indexed on two different market
rates, or on the same market rate but at different repricing dates (for example, 3-month Euribor versus 6-month Euribor).
For example, a credit institution might extend a variable-rate loan priced at Euribor + margin 1, and refinance the loan with
deposits or other variable-rate liabilities paying Libor minus margin 2. Assuming identical maturities, the institution would
earn an amount equal to the sum of the margins (margin 1 + margin 2) in each time period, independent of the evolution
of market rates. However, the institution is exposed to changes in the difference between the two index rates (Euribor
minus Libor). This differential between the two rates – the spread – can change in unexpected ways.
A third source of interest rate risk is the presence of options within certain assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet items.
An option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an instrument or financial contract or to modify the
cash flows it generates. An option can be a separate financial instrument (exchange-traded or over-the-counter option), or
it can be incorporated in other instruments. This last type of option is referred to as an embedded or implicit option.
For example, when a bank customer has the right to prepay a loan, the customer effectively holds a prepayment option
embedded in the loan.84 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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It is interesting to note that while interest rate risk
has always been present – because it is intrinsic to
the transformation function of banking – banks have
only recently begun to address this risk in their
internal control systems. In fact, the magnitude of
interest rate risk has increased as a direct
consequence of the increased volatility in interest
rates following the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates and the liberalisation
of capital movements.
Interest rate risk is reflected in the income statement
through its effect on interest margins on banking
operations. In addition, the present values of assets,
liabilities, and off-balance-sheet items are altered,
because changes in the interest rate alter the value
of the future cash flows that they generate. Effective
and prudent management of interest rate risk is
critical to the overall quality of banks’ internal
management, and, consequently, to the soundness
of banks and the stability of the banking system.
This internal oversight is all the more important,
given that the complexity of the subject – deriving
from the diversity of products (embedded options)
and behavioral assumptions (effective maturity of
a demand deposit) – makes it impossible to establish
a harmonised regulatory framework for interest rate
risk at the European or international level.
Today, the environment for managing interest rate risk
is susceptible to rapid change: a situation that calls for
heightened attention on the part of bank supervisors
and other authorities responsible for financial stability.
• To begin with, banks have enjoyed a long period
of stable interest rates at historically low levels.
A reversal of this situation would be likely to affect
existing balances, and could have a direct impact
on the exposure of credit institutions to interest rate
risk, particularly in a context characterised by heavy
concentrations in real estate loans.
• Furthermore, the regulatory framework is evolving
(interest-bearing demand deposits, changes in
interest rates for regulated savings accounts).
• Finally, new accounting standards International
accounting standards (IAS) could have an impact
on asset-liability management.
1|2 A volatile environment
HISTORICALLY LOW INTEREST RATES
The current economic environment is characterised
by historically very low interest rates in many G-10
countries.
This situation is unusual. Institutions should
therefore carefully assess their ability to absorb the
effects of a significant increase in interest rates,
which would have an immediate impact on
transformation margins: the cost of financing would
generally rise more rapidly than the return on assets,
by virtue of the maturity transformation effected
by the banks.
In fact, outstanding credit at fixed rates and
variable-rate loans with an original rate fixation
period  over one year6 represented 66 percent of
total outstanding on-balance-sheet credit extended
to domestic borrowers as of September 2004.
The largest and most rapidly growing component
of this fixed-rate lending was residential real estate
lending (half of all fixed-rate loans). From mid-2003
to mid-2004, new residential real estate loans have
been granted at low rates, generally between 4.20
and 4.30 percent, compared with an average interest
rate of 4.76 percent for the entire euro zone in
September 2004. In these circumstances, and in the
absence of an appropriate system of asset-liability
management that enables banks to measure their
exposures precisely and to hedge their interest rate
risk, an increase in interest rates could expose them
to a scissor effect in which the cost of funding
increases while the interest produced by assets
remains for the most part frozen.
AN EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Like their European peers, French banks finance a
large proportion of their assets with demand and term
deposits. On October 31, 2004, deposits (excluding
the deposits of other financial institutions, central
government agencies, and depositors from outside
the euro area) represented 24.1 percent of the
aggregate balance sheets of French financial and
6 These loans are sound loans to domestic borrowers, excluding financial counterparties and government agencies, with an initial pricing period
greater than one year (this includes both fixed-rate loans and variable-rate loans whose repricing period exceeds one year).Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 85
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monetary institutions (FMI) and 30.1 percent of
financial and monetary institutions in the euro area.
Both percentages have remained relatively stable
since 1999. However, this stability may be upset by
structural changes affecting the volume of deposits
and the spread between market rates and interest
rates on deposits. In France, structural changes are
foreseeable in at least two areas:
• since August 1, 2004, interest rates on savings
accounts (livrets d’épargne) have been adjusted every
six months according the following automatic
indexing formula:
Interest rate = 0.5 • (3-month Euribor + 12-month
inflation rate excluding tobacco) + 0.25;
• the prohibition on interest-bearing current
accounts has been lifted by the Court of Justice of
the European Community.
While the new indexing formula for regulated
interest rates reduces uncertainty, the consequences
of allowing interest payments on current accounts
depend on at least two variables that must be
modeled: the total amount of checking balances
involved, and the level of interest set. On the first
point, it is possible that the introduction of interest
on current accounts will increase the amount of
demand deposits. On the second point, predicting
the interest rate set for demand deposits will be
complicated by the decorrelation of rates offered,
the evolution of the general level of interest rates,
and the degree of competition for these products.
It is possible that the indexing of interest rates paid
on regulated savings accounts and the lifting of the
prohibition on interest-bearing current accounts will
not significantly alter the conditions for asset-liability
management in France. If the interest paid is modest
– reflecting the current low level of market interest
rates and the stated intention of some banking groups
not to offer interest on current accounts, or to set
below-market rates – there may be only a relatively
modest effect on aggregate demand-deposit balances,
since in this case interest expense would represent a
relatively small increment to the overall cost of deposit
collection (cost of branch networks and other fixed
costs). In addition, it is likely that the remuneration
will most often be set in terms of an adjustable ladder
of fixed rates, rather than a continuously variable rate
set automatically by reference to an external index.
Still, the manner in which banks will react to the
lifting of the prohibition on interest-bearing demand
deposits remains very unpredictable. Behavior that
is inconsistent with sound interest rate risk
management could significantly alter the magnitude
and nature of overall interest rate risk.
THE IMPACT OF IFRS STANDARDS
In theory, the transition to the IAS/International
financial reporting standards (IFRS) framework,
which expands the market valuation of financial
instruments (“fair-value accounting”), could
represent an opportunity for convergence between
the perspectives of asset-liability managers and
financial reporting requirements. However, the
asset-liability managers of French banks are far from
satisfied with the IAS/IFRS framework. Some of the
provisions of the new international accounting
standards – in particular, standard IAS 39 – do not
correspond, in their current versions, to the financial
and economic reality of credit institutions,
particularly with respect to their hedging policies.
Adapting to the new framework will require
extensive work on the part of the banks. It is difficult
to predict the ultimate effects of the accounting
changes, but it is already clear that they will increase
the volatility of bank capital and earnings.
This artificial increase in volatility may encourage
some institutions to transfer their interest rate risk
(and also their liquidity risk) to other economic
actors, by extending more variable-rate loans or by
shortening the term of transactions. These other
economic actors may not be the agents best able to
bear and manage these risks.
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2| LESSONS FROM THE FRENCH
BANKING SYSTEM
2|1 Diversity of systems for measuring
and managing interest rate risk
Before considering the overall capacity of the
banking system to withstand changes in interest
rates, it should be noted that an examination of the
systems used by French banking groups to measure
and manage interest rate risk reveals a considerable
degree of diversity, both in terms of organisation
and management and in terms of the parameters
used. This conclusion is based on periodic reports
submitted to the Banking Commission7 and on
interviews conducted in the first quarter of 2004.
The Commission assessed the ability of credit
institutions to avoid excessive levels of risk through
the adoption of prudent strategies and the use of
risk measurement and management systems suited
to their individual situations.
OBJECTIVES OF ALM
The principal objective of the interest rate risk
management policies of the major French banking
groups is to reduce their exposure to this category
of risk. In all of the institutions surveyed, the
asset-liability management function is not
considered as a profit center in itself; instead, the
gains stemming from asset-liability management are
generally redistributed to the different business lines
according to distribution rules specific to each
institution.
Banking groups do not necessarily hedge their
interest rate risk completely. Indeed, one of the
purposes of asset-liability management is to decide
whether and in what proportion to hedge
interest-rate mismatches. In most financial
institutions, the asset-liability management function
7 Banking groups are subject to regulatory requirements relating to the measurement and monitoring of their interest rate risk and they must
submit annual reports on their exposures to the Banking Commission (Article 43 of Regulation No. 97-02 of the Committee on Banking and
Financial Regulation, on internal control).
manages persistent open interest rate positions
arising from the partial hedging of interest rate risk,
particularly on mismatches in the longest
maturities. These exposures are kept within bounds
by internal limits which reflect the level of risk that
the institution is willing to accept. On the other
hand, voluntary position-taking falls naturally
outside the scope of ALM, since the goal of ALM is
to limit risk and position-taking seeks to assume risk.
Two broad hedging strategies are employed by
institutions: macro-hedging and micro-hedging.
Macro-hedging
Macro-hedging, which is used by virtually all French
banks, consists of hedging the net interest rate risk
generated by all of the bank’s intermediation
activities. Assets and liabilities in the same maturity
band generate offsetting interest rate risk exposures.
These exposures are netted, and the bank hedges
the residual risk. This practice, used for all activities,
is well suited to the circumstances of the major
French banking groups, which can be described as
universal banks whose balance sheets are
characterised by a large proportion of fixed-rate
assets and liabilities in highly diversified retail
portfolios.
The principal danger in an asset-liability
management based on macro-hedging is that it may
encourage to take speculative positions that are
inconsistent with the central objective of reducing
the bank’s overall exposure to interest rate risk.
Transactions using financial futures can give rise
– intentionally or unintentionally – to interest rate
positions (resulting from insufficient hedging,
incorrect assignment of transactions to maturity
bands, etc.) that are not easily detected by external
analysts because they are only reflected to a limited
degree in the bank’s financial statements. For this
reason, French accounting standards require that
macro-hedging with financial futures must satisfy
strict conditions in order to be recognised as hedges
for accounting purposes.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 87
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Micro-hedging
In most banking groups, business units and the ALM
function also have the option of micro-hedging: using
financial instruments to hedge clearly specified
individual exposures. Some banks use micro-hedging
systematically, and it can even replace macro-hedging
as a method for managing interest-rate risk.The
difference between micro and macro-hedging is that
the former manages exposures individually,
transaction by transaction, whereas the latter
manages the bank’s overall exposure on its net
positions in each maturity band.
The financial instruments most frequently used in
micro-hedging (in decreasing order of importance)
are: swaps and forward rate agreements (used by
100 percent of French banking groups), options and
bond instruments (57 percent) and loans and
borrowings (43 percent). Hedging strategies are
designed to cover two different components of the
interest margin. (See Demey, Frachot and
Riboulet,  2003). The certain portion of the
interest-rate mismatch (i.e., transactions for which
the timing and amount of all cash flows is known
and the sensitivity of customers’ interest rates to
market interest rates is constant) is hedged using
swaps. The uncertain portion (i.e. explicit or
embedded options) is generally hedged using
options (for example, caps covering the optional
features of certain loans).
UNDERLYING METHODOLOGIES AND ASSUMPTIONS
The Banking Commission’s examination of the
individual systems used by French banking groups
to measure and manage interest rate risk, indicates
that the methodologies used by the different banks
are on the whole fairly similar. On the other hand,
the examination reveals a wide diversity in
assumptions, particularly those relating to the
characteristics of certain lines of credit and to the
behavior of customers.
To measure their ability to withstand an interest rate
shock, institutions analyse the sensitivity of their
activities to interest rates. These analyses are
generally based on a series of measures or indicators
of overall interest rate risk which reflect the
uncertainties involved in forecasting interest rates
and bank earnings.
The principal measures used are interest rate
mismatches and indicators of the sensitivity to
changes in interest rates of net earnings, the net
present value of the banking book, net banking
income, and bank capital.8
The uniqueness of asset-liability management in
banking lies in the fact that its measurement of
overall interest rate risk depends on the positions
and cash flows generated by balance-sheet and
off-balance-sheet transactions. The calculations
involved in measuring this risk require, at a
minimum, decomposing the outstanding balances
and interest flows associated with assets and
liabilities as a function of their maturities and
interest rates. For certain items – primarily demand
deposits, capital, and certain saving accounts
(Plan d’épargne logement – PEL, Livret d’épargne
populaire – LEP, Compte pour le développement
industriel – CODEVI, and other regulated savings
accounts) – a maturity structure and/or an interest
rate cannot be clearly defined. In these cases, the
banks make assumptions about the timing of cash
flows and the levels of remuneration, based on their
forecasts of changes in the economic environment
and in the behavior of their customers, and also on
the particular strategies pursued by individual banks.
A comparative analysis of the assumptions made
regarding the duration of items without predefined
maturity reveals a significant degree of variation
from one institution to the next. For example, the
duration assigned to demand deposits varies from
2 to 15 years.
If products contain embedded options, this
necessitates a further modeling effort, using
modeling techniques that reflect the institution’s
strategies in the associated business lines. Such
modeling is required, in particular, for behavioral
options which alter the characteristics of loans, such
as prepayment options, and changes in duration (for
example, lengthening the term of housing savings
loans) or in remuneration (transition from fixed rate
to variable rate, a change in interest rate, etc.).
8 See footnote 3.88 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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After conducting the analyses described above, the
institutions conduct sensitivity analyses, which
consist of simulating the impact of an interest rate
shock. The simulations may be either static (the
scenario is an instantaneous shock to the interest
rate) or dynamic (the scenario incorporates changes
in the structure of the banking portfolio resulting
from the interest rate shock, over a given time
horizon).
In addition to using simple scenarios consisting of
parallel shifts in rates (typically an increase of 100
or 200 basis points over the entire yield curve),
institutions conduct simulations using more
sophisticated scenarios, to quantify the effects on
bank portfolios of a change in the shape of the yield
curve. These may include a prolonged drop or rise
in interest rates, a flattening or steepening of the
yield curve. The assumptions used in these scenarios
vary from one bank to the next, which provides part
of the explanation for the great diversity observed
in the results of the simulations. Indeed, this
diversity reflects differences in assumptions (for
example, assumptions about changes in customer
behavior following a shift in interest rates) much
more than differences in methodologies, which are
generally fairly similar. The diversity of results is
indicative of the difficulty involved in establishing
consistent methods for comparing institutions and
for estimating the overall effect on the banking
system of changes in interest rates.
More generally, there is currently no consensus on
standard indicators in asset-liability management in
the banking sector, unlike the management of
market risks, for which standard indicators (VaR –
value at risk – measures and standard stress
scenarios) have gained broad acceptance. This
situation is due to the following factors, which
distinguish banking ALM from the management of
market risks (Demey, Frachot and Riboulet, 2003):
• the positions covered by asset-liability
management result from transactions which remain
on the balance sheet for long periods of time, in
contrast with market risks, which generally involve
short-term exposures;
• the concept of interest rate risk in asset-liability
management is not the same as in the management
of market transactions. Asset-liability management
is concerned with future interest flows generated
by balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet transactions,
whereas market risk management is concerned with
uncertainty about the market value (“mark to
market”) of positions;
• asset-liability management is a method of
controlling the future disequilibrium between
customers’ demand for financing (bank assets) and
customers’ deposits (bank liabilities);
• the behavior of banking customers differs from
that of market participants;
• banking assets are booked in terms of interest
accrued, and not in terms of market value as in the
trading book. Thus, until now, the interest margin
has been more important than market value.
THE ORGANISATION OF THE ALM FUNCTION
IN THE BANKING GROUP
The degree of sophistication of asset-liability
management systems varies from one banking
group to the next, as does its use by management as
a tool for setting policy for the group.
One indicator of the importance accorded to
asset-liability management in the daily operations
of the bank is the presence or absence of a “Funds
Transfer Pricing” (FTP) system that ensures central
management of interest rate risk across all business
units. Only 43 percent of the major French banking
groups surveyed for this study currently have
state-of-the-art FTP systems covering all of their
transactions and business units. The systems used
in these groups can be very detailed, and may even
involve a transaction-by-transaction treatment of
interest rate risk. The remaining financial institutions
are less advanced, using a wide variety of methods
and different levels of detail to manage their overall
interest rate risk. In 14 percent of the groups
surveyed, the development of Funds Transfer Pricing
systems has not proceeded beyond the conceptual
stage.
These differences in management techniques are the
result of broader organisational choices. Groups
whose Funds Transfer Pricing systems are less
advanced are generally those which have a
decentralised management culture. The asset-liability
management function in these groups is provided at
the level of the business units, rather than being
directed by the lead institution. Central managementBanque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 89
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of interest rate risk consists in monitoring limits and
setting uniform procedures. In some groups, it can
be difficult to aggregate exposures to interest rate risk
on a consolidated basis. This form of management
can nevertheless be appropriate for regional
institutions or specialised subsidiaries.
In conclusion, there is no single accepted approach
to the organization of asset-liability management.
Two general types of organization coexist:
• some banking groups have installed
comprehensive centralised systems that measure
and manage interest rate risk on a consolidated basis
using Funds Transfer Pricing systems (with, in some
cases, local execution of ALM management under
central oversight, and refinancing centers);
• other banking groups conduct macro-hedging at
the level of individual legal entities, with a central
control function.
In the absence of a universally applicable indicator
for measuring interest rate risk in the banking book,
the first line of defense against the vulnerability of
banking portfolios to interest rate risk is the
soundness and robustness of internal risk
management and control systems. In this
connection, greater involvement on the part of
decision-making bodies and internal control system
managers would be highly desirable.
2|2 Impact of a persistent large
increase in interest rates
The robustness of the French banking system to an
unusually large shock to the level of interest rates
can be measured using stress tests.
An exercise of this kind was carried out during the
first quarter of 2004 by the General Secretariat of the
Banking Commission and the Department of
Economics and International Affairs of the Banque
de France, in the context of the “Financial Sector
Assessment Program” run by the International
Monetary Fund. Stress tests were conducted on the
seven major French banking groups, which
represented more than 60 percent of total net banking
income in the banking system in 2003 and 80 percent
of total banking assets. The tests measured the ability
of the banks to withstand a set of shocks to interest
rates (De Bandt and Oung, 2004). In addition to the
scenarios provided by the IMF9, which related to the
banks’ trading books, the General Secretariat of the
Banking Commission asked banks participating in
the tests to run an additional scenario operating on
the yield curve: a uniform increase in rates of
300 basis points over a forecast horizon of two years.
For this scenario, the macroeconomic model of the
Banque de France (Mascotte) was used to simulate
the effects on French economic activity of a rate
9 One IMF scenario consisted of a decrease of 50 basis points in overnight rates, no change in 10-year rates, and interpolation for intermediate maturities.
The second IMF scenario consisted of an increase of 150 basis points in short-term rates and an increase of 50 basis points in long-term rates.
Box 2
Funds Transfer Pricing
Funds Transfer Pricing (FTP) rates are the interest rates at which business units place their funds and refinance their
assets with a central unit of the bank (for example, the department of financial management or balance-sheet management).
FTP rates reflect market prices; that is, they are the rates that the business unit would pay if, instead of dealing with the
internal unit responsible for balance sheet management, it had to go directly to the market. They are set using a methodology
which is identical for loans and deposits, and are quoted in relation to market interest rates as a function of the maturity of
transactions. FTP rates can be calculated transaction by transaction for all ’contractual’ balance-sheet items, as a function
of their currency, term, the nature of the interest rate, and the presence of any embedded options. For fixed-term transactions,
the FTP rate corresponds to the swap rate increased by the funding cost, which can add several basis points. For other
balance-sheet items (such as demand deposits), the maturity structure of each product is modeled and Funds Transfer
Pricing matches sources and uses of resources flow by flow.
The implementation of asset-liability management requires a strict separation of responsibilities between operational
(deposit-taking and lending, profit centers) and functional (ALM unit) departments in the management of intermediation
margins.90 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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increase persisting for two years (an increase of
150 basis points in the first year, with a further
increase of 150 basis points in the following year).
The shift in the yield curve resulted in a slowing of
economic activity (a reduction of 0.4 percentage
points in the forecast for economic growth in 2005),
with particularly large effects on private
consumption, investment, and above all credit to
businesses and households (a reduction of
5.4 percentage points in the forecast for credit growth
in 2005).
Using the results of the rate-increase scenario and
models developed by the General Secretariat of the
Banking Commission, it was possible to analyse the
initial impact on the French banking system – and on
bank profitability and solvency effects in particular –
of the impact on economic activity and credit growth
associated with the stress scenario. The results of this
analysis are presented in the table following.
The simulations carried out by the Banking
Commission indicate that the profitability of the
banks would decline by an average of 13 percent at
the end of two years (compared to a decline of
9 percent predicted by simulations carried out by the
banks themselves), as the result of an increase in
risks and a contraction in loan demand.
The outcomes generated by this stress scenario, while
certainly significant for the banking system, remain
manageable in view of the size of the initial shock.
3| MONITORING
INTEREST RATE RISK
The leading concern of bank supervisors, and, more
generally, of the authorities responsible for financial
stability, is to ensure that banks have sufficient
capital to cover their interest rate risk exposures in
case the risk should materialise, and that this risk is
properly monitored and managed.
This concern is heightened by the current context
of accounting and regulatory reform (see above).
In particular, new accounting valuation standards
based on market value are likely to result in larger
and more frequent materialisations of interest rate
risk on bank balance sheets. This necessitates
improvement, rationalisation, and harmonisation of
the internal control of interest rate risk, in particular
in the implementation of Pillar 2 of the new capital
framework.
3|1 Current requirements
The 1996 Market Risk amendments to the original
Basel Accord introduced capital charges for interest
rate risk only in the trading book. Bank policies
regarding the treatment of interest rate risk in the
banking book remain varied, reflecting the diversity
of their strategies and financing structures. In light
of the multiplicity of methods, particularly for
assessing the interest rate risk of products with
indefinite maturities such as demand deposits,
supervisors have chosen not to set a capital charge
for interest rate risk in the banking book.
The Basel Committee remains convinced, however,
of the importance of interest rate risk in the banking
book. The attention of supervisory authorities is
therefore drawn to the Basel Committee’s principles
for the management of interest rate risk (Basel
Committee, 1997), implemented in French national
rules by Regulation CRBF No. 97-02 relating to internal
controls. Only a few other national supervisors (the
Office of Thrift Supervision in the United States, the
Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission,
and the Swiss Federal Banking Commission) have
instituted more detailed disclosure requirements.
3 0 0 2 - d n e s i s a B n o z i r o h 5 0 0 2 h t i w n o i t a l u m i s s s e r t s o r c a M
t e N
s g n i n r a e
l a t i p a C s t n e m e r i u q e R l a t i p a C
e r o f e b o i t a r
k c o h s
t e n 5 0 0 2 n o t c a p m I
t e n o t e v i t a l e r s g n i n r a e
3 0 0 2 s g n i n r a e
o i t a r I I l e s a B
k c o h s r e t f a
l a t i p a c n i e g n a h C
e g a t n e c r e p n i o i t a r
s t n i o p
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3|2 Benefits
of the new capital framework
The new capital framework (Basel II) improves the
recognition of banking risks (Thoraval and
Duchâteau, 2003), but it does not impose an explicit
regulatory capital requirement for interest rate risk
under Pillar 1. It does, however, mandate a review
of interest rate risk in the banking book under
Pillar 2. The purpose of Pillar 2 is to capture risks
which are difficult to formalise or harmonise within
the framework of Pillar 1. Then, under the oversight
of their supervisors, institutions calculate the amount
of economic capital they need to cover all of their
risk exposures: those covered in a harmonised
fashion under Pillar 1 and those covered by Pillar 2.
Institutions must also furnish their supervisors with
the results produced by their internal risk-
measurement systems when confronted with a
standard interest rate shock, defined as an
instantaneous parallel shift of 200 basis points.
At present, 30 percent of French banking groups
apply the approach recommended by the Basel
Committee i.e., measuring the sensitivity of their
economic capital to interest rate shocks.
Box 3
Pillar 2 of the New Basel Accord
Pillar 2 is a central element of the new capital framework. Its objectives are two fold:
For supervisors, the objective is to ensure that institutions have adequate systems for evaluating and monitoring all of
their risks, and that they maintain capital levels commensurate with their risk profile. This involves assessing each type of
risk to which banks are exposed. European bank supervisors also verify that the various risks covered by Pillar 2 are
managed in conformity with the criteria set forth in European Directives. This assessment constitutes the “supervisory
review and evaluation process” (SREP), which is outlined in the following diagram:
PILLAR 1 PILLAR 2
Explicit capital charges to cover risks: Elements for assessment by supervisors,
focusing on risk measurement and control:
• credit risk
• market risk • interest rate risk in the banking book
• operational risk • residual risk
• risks associated with securitisation
• stress testing
• settlement risk
• information technology, continuity, and reputation risk
• liquidity risk
Based on the results of these analyses, the supervisor can require an institution to take corrective actions, and in
particular to increase its prudential capital.
For institutions, the objective is to develop techniques for controlling and managing their risks and to put in place a
process for assessing economic capital which is adapted to the institution’s risk profile and business strategies. In this
process – the “Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process” (ICAAP), the institution calculates its minimum capital
requirement under Pillar 1, and also calculates the amount of economic capital that it needs to allocate internally to cover
all of the risks to which it is exposed.92 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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3|3 Macro-prudential
oversight of interest rate risk
The experience gained by banks and supervisors in
monitoring and managing interest rate risk clearly
indicates the absence of any universally accepted
indicator for asset-liability management. This is in
contrast with the management of market risk, for which
there is a broad consensus on the use of Value at Risk
(VaR) models and the choice of stress scenarios.
This absence of an accepted benchmark, in an
environment marked by a certain volatility in
financial securities, makes it indispensable that bank
supervisors, and, more generally, the authorities
responsible for financial stability, should have the
clearest possible conception of the sensitivity of the
banking system to interest rate risk, and of the
banking system’s ability to transmit interest rate
change to the economy as a whole.
The value of the Basel II framework, from the
perspective of macro-prudential oversight of the
banking system, is that it provides a methodology
for comparative analysis based on the variation in
the economic value of credit institutions resulting
from a standard interest rate shock.
It must be kept in mind, however, that the results
obtained from this type of calculation depend very
heavily on the underlying assumptions, which are
in turn a function of the strategic choices made by
the institutions. This is the case, for example, for
assumptions regarding the timing of payments
generated by products without fixed maturities (such
as demand deposits and housing savings loans),
methods for valuing embedded options, and the
choice of modelling techniques.
Moreover, proposals to standardise parameters and
to establish detailed supervisory formulas for
calculating interest rate risk in the banking book do
not have the unanimous support of bank
supervisors. Such standardisation would provide a
uniform measure of interest rate risk for the banking
system, but that measure would be less precise and
farther removed from the specific circumstances of
individual banks. Indeed, the estimation of
parameters and the choice of behavioral models are
typically based on studies supported by historical data
corresponding to the circumstances and customer
relationships of individual institutions. The
determination and evolution of these internal
parameters should be reviewed periodically by the
institutions’ internal control units.
Box 4
Overview of foreign regulations requiring a quantitative measure
of interest rate risk in the banking book
Only a few foreign supervisory authorities have established detailed quantitative reporting requirements for interest rate
risk, and only one has set an explicit regulatory capital requirement.
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the regulator of savings banks and savings and loan associations in the United
States, adopted a regulation on interest rate risk in the banking book in 1991, in the aftermath of the “savings and loan
crisis” which cost American taxpayers 180 billion dollars. The regulation sets forth a standardised method for calculating
capital requirements for interest rate risk. The calculation is carried out in two stages. The first step determines the market
value of all the financial instruments in the institution’s portfolio of assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet instruments.
The second step calculates the impact of 200 basis point shocks – both up and down – on that market value.
The Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission requires banks to submit detailed quantitative reports which
the Commission uses to evaluate the overall interest rate risk in the banks’ banking and trading books. The Commission
calculates the impact of a shift in interest rates on future earnings (“Earnings at Risk”) and on the market value of the
institution (Economic Value). These calculations are used to identify “outlier” institutions relative to fixed thresholds.
They also make it possible to compare the sensitivity of different institutions to interest rate risk.
The Swiss Federal Banking Commission has a two-part quantitative reporting system. The first part is a survey of raw
data: cash flows broken down by maturity and loan category. The second part is a survey of the levels of internal risk
indicators judged most relevant by the bank. The bank is also required to calculate the effect of a parallel shift of plus or
minus 100 basis points on the net present value of the bank’s positions.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 93
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In addition, while the application of a standard
interest rate shock to the entire yield curve has the
advantage of simplicity, and facilitates comparisons
between different institutions, it is not capable of
identifying exposures resulting from other scenarios,
such as a negatively sloped yield curve or shifts in
slope in the yield curve. These scenarios are an
essential component of interest rate risk
management and internal control systems as set forth
in French banking regulation, following the
principles laid down by the Basel Committee and
implemented by French bank supervisors in a
manner tailored to the characteristics of the regulated
institutions.94 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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